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Page Title: Transmission Security
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Cryptographic Operations and Operator Requirements
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Information Systems Technician Training Series, Module 1 - Administration and Security
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Meaconing, Intrusion, Jamming, and Interference (MIJI)

on-the-job training. The CMS custodian is responsible for ensuring that cryptographic operators receive the training  necessary  to  perform  these  duties  and  that  they meet the following minimum qualifications: Be properly cleared for access to the material with which they will be working; Be authorized by the commanding officer to perform crypto duties; and Be familiar with local crypto procedures. TRANSMISSION  SECURITY Transmission  security  results  from  measures designed to protect transmission from interception and exploitation  by  means  other  than  cryptographic analysis.  In  the  next  paragraphs,  we  will  discuss specific methods of transmission security. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (COMSEC)  EQUIPMENT There  are  numerous  types  of  cryptographic equipment  used  throughout  the  Navy.  However,  they all perform the same basic function—to encipher or decipher a communications signal. During  secure  transmission,  the  cryptoequipment accepts  a  “plain  text”  teleprinter  or  data  signal containing classified information from the classified (red) patch panel and adds a “key” (randomly chosen bits generated internally). This composite signal is relayed as an encrypted signal. Following this encryption, the signal is fed to the unclassified  (black)  patch  panel  where  it  is  patched directly to a converter. This converted audio signal is then routed to the transmitter for transmission. Over-the-Air   Rekey/Transfer   (OTAR/OTAT) Many of the new cryptosystems that use the 128-bit electronic key (ANDVT, KY-58, KG-84A/C, and KY-75) are now capable of obtaining new or updated key  via  the  circuit  they  protect  or  other  secure communications circuits. This process is known as over-the-air  rekey  (OTAR) or over-the-air   transfer (OTAT). The use of OTAR or OTAT drastically reduces the  distribution  of  physical  keying  material  and  the physical  process  of  loading  cryptoequipments  with  key tapes. A station may have nothing to do with actual physical CRYPTO changeovers on a day-to-day basis. All an operator would have to do is observe the alarm indications and ensure the alarm indicator returns to operate.  The  electronic  key  would  normally  come  from the Net Control Station (NCS). The added feature of OTAT is that the key can be extracted from an OTAT-capable cryptosystem using a KYK-13  or  KYX-15/KYX-15A.  The  key  is  then loaded into another cyptosystem as needed. More detailed information on OTAR/OTAT is available in the Procedures Manual for Over-the-Air Transfer (OTAT) and Over-the-Air Rekey (OTAR) and Field Generation and Over-the-Air Distribution of Tactical Electronic Key,  NAG-16C/TSEC. Authentication Authentication is a security measure designed to protect a communications or command system against fraudulent transmissions or simulation. Authenticating systems  have  instructions  specifying  the  method  of  use and   transmission   procedures.   By   using   an authenticating  system  properly,  an  operator  can distinguish between genuine and fraudulent stations or transmissions. A station may include authentication in a transmitted message. This security measure is called transmission   authentication.   The   types   of authentication  are: l l Challenge and Reply—  This is a prearranged system   whereby   one   station   requests authentication  of  another  station  (the  challenge). By   a   proper   response,   the   latter   station establishes its authenticity (the reply). Transmission  Authentication—  A station establishes   the   authenticity   of   its   own transmission  by  either  a  message-  or  a self-authentication   method.   A   message authentication is a procedure that a station uses to  include  an  authenticator  in  the  transmitted message. Self-authentication is a procedure that a station uses to establish its own authenticity, and the called station is not required to challenge the  calling  station. The  following  examples  are  instances  when authentication  is  mandatory: l l l A station suspects intrusion on a circuit; A   station   is   challenged   or   requested   to authenticate; A station directs radio silence or requires another station to break an imposed radio silence; and 3-11

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