The termination of court-martial jurisdiction

Coast Guardsmen, who were assigned to the same command.

The crimes occurred off

post in his private home. The lower court first upheld the conviction, finding the

offenses were service-connected: "The offenses by their very nature contained

within them a disrupting effect on good order and discipline on that staff."

was, said the court, "a grievous breach of faith by one shipmate against another."

Although the crimes occurred off post, "a command is more than a physical place or

property; is it an organization of people."

The conviction was affirmed, since

"sex offenses against children...

have a continuing effect on the victims and

their families and ultimately on the morale of any military unit or organization to

which the family member is assigned." U.S. v. Solorio, 21 MJ 251 (CMA, 1986). The

stage was set for review by the U.S. Supreme Court, which had originally created

the service-connection test back in 1969.

In Solorio v. U.S., 483 US 435 97 LEd.2d 364, 107 SCt 2924 (1987), the

Supreme Court noted the "confusion" that had been created by the service-connection

test.

It then ruled that the jurisdiction of a court-martial "depends solely on

the accused's status as a member of the armed forces, and not on the 'service

connection' of the offense charged. Thus, O'Callahan is overruled." The test for

jurisdiction, then, is solely "one of status--namely, whether the accused in the

court-martial proceeding is a person who can be regarded as falling with the term

'land and naval forces'... the requirements of the Constitution are not violated

where, as here, a court-martial is convened to try a servicemember."

In other

words, the soldier may be court-martialed, whether the crimes occurred on or off

post.

Military jurisdiction is unique, then, in that it always follows the

soldier, on or off-post.

Remember, that the Army has investigative authority over matters where

there is "an Army interest."

This includes that situation where "there is a

reasonable basis to believe that a suspect may be subject to the UCMJ." (AR 195-2,

paragraph 3-lb.)

Where the crime takes place off post, there will be a need to

coordinate with the civilian authorities. TJAG policy Memo 87-5 (28 Jul 87) states

that SJAs should review any MOUs that they have with local civilian prosecutors, as

the Solorio case will make such coordination necessary:

"When federal, state, or local civil enforcement authorities have

concurrent jurisdiction, investigative responsibility will be determined in

coordination with that authority.

When concurrent jurisdiction or

authority to investigate exists and neither the Army nor the civil

authorities accede to the other's primary responsibility to investigate,

both may pursue the investigation in fulfillment of their respective

interests, with neither impeding the other." (AR 195-2, paragraph 3-2a.)

The termination of court-martial jurisdiction.

AR 635-200, paragraph 1-

31(a), states the general rule that a discharge "is effective at 2400 hours on the

date of notice of discharge."

If the soldier is given a discharge certificate

earlier, however, and allowed to leave, court-martial jurisdiction may be lost. A

good example of what can happen is U.S. v. Howard, 20 MJ 353

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