Should  deterrence  fail,  the  U.S.  Navy’s mission  is  the  forward  defense  of  the  United  States and its allies. The key objective is protection of SLOCs  from  the  United  States  to  Europe  and Asia.  To  accomplish  that  objective,  the  U.S.  Navy will engage Soviet naval forces in the Soviet “sea control”  and  “sea  denial”  zones.  The  overall objective  of  the  engagement  will  be  to  remove  the enemy’s  offensive  and  defensive  capabilities  and ensure freedom of the seas for the United States and its allies while deterring Soviet use of nuclear weapons  at  sea. SUBMARINES.  —The  last  U.S.  diesel  sub- marine,    the  USS  Blueback  (SS  581),  was decommissioned on 1 October 1990. The remaining U.S.  attack  submarine  force  is  composed  of Sturgeon-,  Skipjack-,  Skate-,  Permit-,  and Los   Angeles-class   nuclear-powered   submarines (SSNs).  The  United  States  SSBNs  form  the  sea leg  of  the  U.S.  Trident  nuclear  deterrent.  The SSBN  force  includes  the  Lafayette-,  James Madison-,  Benjamin  Franklin-,  and  Ohio-class submarines (fig. 1-6). The United States has a smaller, but more effective,  submarine  force  than  the  Soviets because  of  a  superior  knowledge  of  submarine technology.  That  technology  has  resulted  in superior  submarine  quieting  systems,  combat systems,  and  antisubmarine  warfare  (ASW)  open ocean  acoustic  surveillance  and  detection  systems. These  systems  enable  the  United  States  and  its allies to maintain a superior technological and numerical  advantage  over  the  Soviet  submarine force. The  principle  Soviet  platform  for  both offensive and defensive naval warfare is the submarine. The Soviets use the SSBN as their principle strategic platform. They use attack (SS and SSN) and cruise missile (SSGN) submarines to  counter  submarine  and  surface  ship  threats. The SS, SSN, and SSGN submarines are the primary threat to U.S. and allied sea lines of communications (SLOCs). The Soviet navy has the  world’s  largest  general-purpose  submarine force, totaling about 300 active units. We expect the  Soviets  to  decrease  their  submarine  force  in number during the 1990s and beyond. That decrease  will  occur  as  they  replace  older  sub- marines  with  newer  diesel  and  nuclear-powered submarines. The decrease in the total number of submarines  will  not  lessen  the  threat  of  their submarine force because of improvements in design,  stealth,  and  combat  capability. SURFACE SHIPS. —The Soviet Union and the U.S. naval surface forces have different missions (fig. 1-7). The Soviets are primarily a coastal navy emerging into a blue water fleet. The  Soviets  can  provide  only  limited  long-range power  projection  of  surface  forces  or  naval  air superiority.  These  limitations  result  from  their primary  mission  of  providing  protection  to  the mainland and defending the ballistic missile submarine force close to the mainland. The principle weakness of the Soviet navy is its  relative  lack  of  priority  in  providing  underway replenishment.  The  Soviets  rely  on  their  extensive merchant  fleet  to  provide  supplies  to  ships engaged  in  sustained  long-range  operations. Another weakness of the Soviet surface navy is the lack of long-range air power like that provided by a U.S. carrier battle group. That situation will change somewhat as aircraft carriers now  under  construction  are  brought  into  service during the 1990s. AIRCRAFT. —Soviet shipborne capable air- craft are primarily limited to helicopters and vertical/short  takeoff  and  landing  (V/STOL) aircraft. The Soviets are increasing their air capability with the introduction of the new Tbilisi- class aircraft carrier that will include the new Yak-41  V/STOL  fighter  and  the  Su-27  Flanker. Despite the introduction of that class of aircraft carrier, Soviet naval aviation (refer to table 1-1) will  remain  primarily  a  land-based  force. U.S. naval aviation (refer to table 1-2) is a versatile multimission force capable of providing fleet defense, ASW, and long-range strike and attack capability. The United States should continue to retain a significant advantage in seaborne air power for the foreseeable future. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL  WEAPONS The  increase  of  chemical  and  biological weapons  has  become  a  global  problem.  To  date, more countries than ever have chemical and biological  weapons.  It  is  alarming  that  many  of these  countries  are  in  areas  of  strategic  importance to the United States. In the Middle East the problem  is  particularly  acute. Third  World  countries  view  the  use  of chemical and biological weapons differently than the United States. The United States’ stance on chemical and biological weapons is “that it is abhorrent,  reprehensible,  and  unacceptable  that chemical weapons ever be used against the men 1-12